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Abstract
This paper analyzes bank- and loan-specific characteristics that determine the
amount of retained interest held by US banks in mortgage securitizations. Eco-
nomic theory suggests that retaining an interest in securitization transactions
should help to mitigate information asymmetry problems between the parties
involved. For a sample of bank holding companies, I find that credit risk of
the transferred mortgages is positively associated with the amount of retained
interest held, consistent with investor demand for a signal of (credit) quality
of the securitized assets. The demand for such a signal seems to be lower for
banks with an established reputation for securitization transactions. Consistent
with the view of securitization as a sophisticated tool to manage risk from
loan origination, more sophisticated banks seem to hold more retained inter-
est. It also appears that retained interest is negatively associated with credit
risk exposure from other assets. These findings suggest that retained interest
in securitization transactions serves as a mechanism to mitigate information
asymmetry problems as well as a means to manage a bank’s risk profile.
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1 Introduction
Securitization has been at the heart of the financial crisis. In a securitization
transaction a firm pools assets and issues securities with a right to payments backed
by the pool of assets.1 US banks used this instrument on a large scale. The issuance
volume of total asset-backed securities reached nearly $3 trillion at its peak in 2005. A
large part consisted of so called non-agency or private-label mortgage-backed securities
with an issuance volume of almost $900 billion.2 When markets for securitization
products dried up, severe mispricing of risks and conflicts of interest between parties
involved in securitization transactions became evident (Fender and Mitchell, 2009a;
Keys et al., 2010). The source of these problems were information asymmetries
between securitizers and investors (Ashcraft and Schuermann, 2008). In response to
those deficiencies of the securitization market, US Congress passed the Dodd-Frank
Act in 2010, which requires that securitizers shall retain an economic interest in the
credit risk of any asset-backed security.3 Basically, the required threshold is at least
five percent with certain exemptions. US bank regulators are currently working on a
final rule to implement this "skin in the game" requirement.4 Similarly, Article 122a
of the Capital Requirement Directive II (2009) allows European banks only to invest
in asset-backed securities if the securitizer retains a material economic interest of at
least five percent.
Economic theory suggests that retaining an interest in securitization transactions
should help to mitigate information asymmetry problems between the parties involved
(Pennacchi, 1988; Boot and Thakor, 1993). So investors should demand securitizers
to retain an interest in asset-backed securities even without any regulation. However,
the severe problems of securitization transactions during the financial crisis raise
concerns whether retained interest effectively worked as a mechanism to mitigate
information asymmetry problems. These concerns and the regulatory intervention
lead to two important empirical questions: First, did securitizers retain an interest in
securitization transactions in the time before the Dodd-Frank Act and, in particular,
in the period before the financial crisis? Second, what determines the amount of
1 See Greenbaum and Thakor (1987).
2 See SIFMA (2012a) and SIFMA (2012b). A non-agency or private-label security is any security
that is not issued by a government agency, e.g., the Government National Mortgage Association
(Ginnie Mae), or by a government-sponsored enterprise (GSE), e.g., the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) and the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie
Mae).
3 See Section 941 of the Dodd-Frank Act (2010).
4 See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2013). For the discussion about the
implementation of the final rule see also Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(2010); Senate Report 111-176 (2010); Federal Agencies (2011).
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retained interest when there is no regulation? Evidence on these questions is rather
limited. In particular, there are hardly any empirical studies on the determinants of
retained interest and there is none which focuses on the US setting.
This paper contributes to the research on securitization transactions by analyzing
the amount of retained interest that US banks held from mortgage securitizations in
the period before the financial crisis. It is the first study to provide empirical evidence
on the determinants of retained interest in the US setting. The findings suggest that
a large fraction of banks at least did not hold retained interest during the entire
life of their mortgage-backed securities. Splitting sample banks into different groups
according to their business models shows that banks with an originate-to-distribute
business model held relatively small retained interest while having securitized assets
with relatively high credit risk. This observation is consistent with the view that
for this particular group of banks investors neglected the risk of the securitized
mortgages. A possible explanation is that these banks were very active in the
securitization market and that investors relied on the banks’ established reputation
for securitization transactions.
However, for the entire sample the analysis of the determinants of retained interest
points towards a significantly positive association between credit risk of the securitized
mortgages and the amount of retained interest. This result is consistent with investor
demand for a signal of the (credit) quality of the securitized mortgages. In addition,
banks that belong to the top issuers of mortgage-backed securities during the sample
period hold less retained interest. The demand for a signal of the quality of the
securitized assets therefore seems to be lower for banks with an established reputation
for securitization transactions. I also find that more sophisticated banks seem to hold
more retained interest. This observation is in line with the view of securitization as
a sophisticated tool to manage risk from loan origination. Finally, retained interest
appears to be negatively associated with credit risk exposure from other assets. Taken
together, the findings suggest that retained interest in securitization transactions
generally serves as a mechanism to mitigate information asymmetry problems as well
as a means to manage a bank’s risk profile.
The data used for the empirical analysis in this paper are obtained from FR Y-9C
reports. Bank holding companies have to file these statements when they have
total consolidated assets of $500million or more. Banks file these reports quarterly
on a consolidated basis with the Federal Reserve. Since 2001 the reports require
detailed information about banks’ securitization activities, including information
about retained interest and delinquencies of securitized loans. The empirical analysis
uses a sample of 1,355 firm-quarters from 164 bank holding companies to examine
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the determinants of retained interest in the period from 2001 to 2006.
Most extant research has only indirectly documented risk retention in securitization
transactions. Prior studies have focused on the impact of securitization transactions
on securitizers’ equity or credit risk. Niu and Richardson (2006) show that off-balance-
sheet debt of securitization structures has the same risk-relevance for explaining the
securitizer’s beta factor as on-balance-sheet debt. Landsman et al. (2008) examine the
value relevance of securitized assets. Their findings suggest that market participants
view securitized assets as belonging to the securitizing firm which is contrary to
an effective risk transfer in securitization transactions. In other studies, there is
evidence that the source of such risk retention is retained interest in the securitized
assets. Chen et al. (2008) find that securitizers’ stock return volatility is positively
associated with retained interest. Barth et al. (2012) analyze the credit risk relevance
of securitization transactions. They observe that credit risk is positively related to
retained interest and not to the total volume of securitized assets when credit risk is
measured using credit ratings.
There is little empirical research on the motives and the extent of risk retention in
securitization transactions. The study that is most closely related to mine is Franke
et al. (2012). The authors find that the amount of retained interest is negatively
associated with the quality of the securitized assets in a sample of European CDO
transactions. However, securitizations of US mortgages played a central role in
the financial crisis. As Franke et al. (2012) note, in securitizations of mortgages
there may be different measures for the quality of the securitized assets and the
diversification of the mortgage pools is different from the pool of corporate loans and
bonds in a European CDO transaction. It is therefore unclear whether the results for
European CDO transactions hold for securitizations of US mortgages. My study aims
to contribute to this question. It is the first study to analyze the relation between the
credit risk of securitized mortgages and the amount of retained interest. Moreover, it
is also the first study that identifies additional determinants of a securitizer’s decision
to retain interest such as the securitizer’s reputation and sophistication.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the structure
of a typical securitization transaction and reviews related literature. Section 3 develops
the hypotheses about the determinants of retained interest. Section 4 discusses the
sample selection procedure and the research design. Section 5 presents results from
the empirical analysis and Section 6 concludes.
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2 Background on Securitization Transactions
2.1 Typical Structure and Accounting Treatment
Securitization is the process of transforming assets into securities, which are then
called "asset-backed securities" (Kothari, 2006). In the following example of a bank se-
curitizing a loan portfolio, I discuss the typical structure of a securitization transaction.
Figure 1 depicts the simplified structure of the process.
[Insert figure 1 here]
The bank in this transaction is called the originator or transferor. It transfers a
portfolio of loans (Loan Portfolio B in the example of Figure 1) to another entity. The
entity which acquires the assets is referred to as the transferee. Often, the transferee
is a special purpose entity (SPE) which is created by the bank for the sole purpose of
acquiring the assets. The SPE then issues asset-backed securities which represent a
claim on the future cash flows from the transferred assets. The cash proceeds from
the issuance of the asset-backed securities are passed on to the originator as purchase
price for the transferred assets. Typically, asset-backed securities are structured into
different tranches with different risk profiles. In the example of Figure 1 the SPE
issues four different tranches (tranche A to D). The tranches are tailored to meet
the particular risk appetite of the investors in the asset-backed securities (Boot and
Thakor, 1993; BCBS, 2011). One of the key differences of the tranches is the priority
of claims, i.e. the specific order in which investors receive payments on the securities.
Tranche A is structured as the senior class. Investors in tranche A are the first to
receive payments on their securities. The claims of investors in the other tranches are
subordinated. In the example of Figure 1 the other tranches are referred to as the
mezzanine class, the junior class and the first-loss piece to indicate the descending
order of the claims. If the cash flows generated by the transferred assets are not
sufficient to settle all claims, investors in subordinated tranches will suffer losses.
Thus, each tranche bears a different risk of loss. The most junior class is tranche D;
this class is referred to as the first-loss piece. As this tranche is riskier than the others,
investors usually do not purchase it. Instead, the originating bank takes the first-loss
piece. In this way, the bank retains an interest in the transferred loans. That is why
the tranche held by the bank is called retained interest. Retained interest can have
different forms and is not restricted to the first-loss piece. Actually, if investors do
not purchase the other tranches entirely, the bank will also take a part of the other
tranches.
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Retained interest is a form of credit enhancement provided by the originating bank
(Kothari, 2006). Credit enhancement is necessary to mitigate information asymmetry
problems arising in the transfer of the assets (Pennacchi, 1988; Boot and Thakor,
1993; DeMarzo and Duffie, 1999; Chen et al., 2008; Landsman et al., 2008). The size
of the credit enhancement is directly related to the cost of the transaction.5 Generally
speaking, if the transferred assets are riskier the originator will have to provide more
credit enhancement, e.g., in the form of a larger first-loss piece or retaining a part of
the other subordinated tranches. In this way, the cost of the transaction increases
because a smaller part of the tranches is sold to investors.
2.2 Related Literature
The role of securitization in the finanical crisis has triggered a large literature on secu-
ritization transactions. Among the primary issues investigated are the determinants
of the decision to securitize assets, the effects on the originator’s risk profile and the
design of securitization transactions.6 More recently, there is also a debate on pro-
posals to require securitizers to retain interest from securitizations. These proposals
are the response to conflicts of interests which during the crisis became particularly
evident between financial institutions and other stakeholders in the securitization
chain (BCBS, 2011). As securitization transactions are most common with financial
institutions (Dechow et al., 2010) most of the research concentrates on the financial
industry and on securitization of loans.
With regard to the question why banks securitize, early theoretical papers conclude
that in the 1980’s the erosion of subsidies linked to deposit insurance, loan loss
provisioning and housing seems to have prompted the growth of securitization as a
substitute for traditional deposit financing (Cumming, 1987; Greenbaum and Thakor,
1987). Empirical findings from research on the determinants of loan sales by Pavel
and Phillis (1987) support this view. However, their results also point to other
important factors such as the need of banks to raise funds for using their competitive
advantage in originating and servicing loans or the wish for asset diversification.
More recent studies which specifically investigate securitization transactions conclude
that regulatory arbitrage and bank size drive securitizations (Uzun and Webb, 2007).
For the Spanish setting (Martín-Oliver and Saurina, 2007) and the Italian setting
(Mazzuca and Agostino, 2009; Affinito and Tagliaferri, 2010) there is evidence that
5 For a detailed discussion of the different forms and the sizing of credit enhancements, see
Kothari (2006), pp. 191-230.
6 See Schipper and Yohn (2007) for a survey of research related in particular to the accounting
for securitization transactions.
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liquidity needs are an important determinant of the decision to securitize. Bannier
and Hänsel (2008) analyze a comprehensive sample of European banks. They observe
that a bank is more likely to securitize the higher its credit risk exposure, the lower
its liquidity and the lower its performance. For a worldwide sample, Panetta and
Pozzolo (2010) report similar results.
Studies on the effects of securitization on the originators risk profile generally
suggest that capital market participants view risk transfer as limited. Niu and
Richardson (2006) document that the off-balance-sheet debt backed by securitized
assets has the same relevance for explaining firm beta as on-balance-sheet debt.
Landsman et al. (2008) examine the value relevance of outstanding securitized
assets and find that in the view of market participants the risk and rewards of
the ownership of the transferred assets reside with the originator. They argue
that an effective risk transfer cannot take place because the securitization structure
must be bankruptcy remote.7 The originator achieves such bankruptcy remoteness
through providing credit enhancements to the securitization structure. Primary credit
enhancements are implicit recourse and retained interest. Implicit recourse is an
informal understanding between the originator and the investors that the originator
will not let the securitization structure fail. Retained interest serves as a costly
signal concerning the quality of the transferred assets. Both means of risk retention
impede an effective transfer of the risks of the securitized assets. Consistently, Casu
et al. (2011) observe that banks with a greater balance of outstanding securitized
assets choose on-balance-sheet portfolios of lower credit risk. However, this stream of
research has not explicitly examined the effects of retained interest.
Another strand of literature has studied the effects of retained interest on the
originators risk profile more closely. Barth et al. (2012) find that credit risk is positively
associated with retained interest, but not with the amount of outstanding securitized
assets, when the authors measure credit risk using credit ratings. When credit risk is
measured using credit spreads, only the amount of outstanding securitized assets is
risk relevant. Chen et al. (2008) study the relevance of outstanding securitized assets
and retained interest for banks’ equity risk. They find that the amount of outstanding
securitized assets and some forms of retained interest are positively associated with
banks’ stock return volatility. They also show that on average the amount and type
of retained interest depend on the class of the securitized assets, i.e. mortgages,
consumer, or commercial and other loans. They explain this results by different
characteristics across different asset classes. However, they do not analyze variation
7 An entity is a bankruptcy remote entity if chances of bankruptcy have been made remote. See
Kothari (2006), p. 41.
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of factors like credit risk within asset classes.
Research on the structure of securitization transactions has dealt with the effect
of variation in credit risk on the amount of retained interest. However, empirical
research on this subject is still limited. Franke and Krahnen (2007) use a simulation
model to analyze the risk sharing in collateralized debt obligation transactions and
empirically test their findings on a dataset of 43 European collateralized loan obligation
transactions. They show that the amount of retained interest increases with their
measure of the expected credit risk of the securitized assets. Franke et al. (2012)
extend this analysis to a sample of 169 European collateralized debt transactions
of European corporate loans and bonds. Using information about the credit risk of
these loans and bonds published by Moody’s, the authors find that the amount of
retained interest is strongly inversely related to asset pool quality as measured by
credit risk. However, they limit the generality of their findings since their sample size
is only modest and their dataset includes only collateralized debt obligations. They
warn to apply their findings to securitizations of other claims like mortgages, because
the measures for the quality of mortgages and the diversification of the mortgage
pools are different from corporate loans and bonds. Instead, Franke et al. (2012) call
for additional research on the US setting.
My paper follows the research by Franke et al. (2012). It is the first paper to
examine the effect of credit risk of securitized mortgages on the amount of retained
interest. One major contribution is the specific analysis of variation of credit risk
within a single asset class. To identify additional determinants of a securitizer’s
decision to retain interest, the analysis also takes into account specific characteristics
of the securitizing banks such as reputation and sophistication.
Another contribution of my paper is to inform the debate on proposals to require
securitizers to retain interest in securitizations. The proposals for risk retention aim
at aligning the interests of securitizers with the interests of investors in asset-backed
securities.8 While some authors argue that retention regulation could in fact be
detrimental, because the cost of retention reduces the margin for securitization of
high-quality assets (Hattori and Ohashi, 2011), most authors and policy makers view
retention as beneficial (see e.g. Malekan and Dionne, 2012). The proposals were
turned into legislation with the Dodd-Frank Act (2010) in the US and the Capital
Requirement Directive II (2009) in the EU. Currently, the debate focuses on the way
securitizers should be required to retain an interest. Fender and Mitchell (2009b) show
in a model-based analysis that sometimes holding more senior securities, such as the
8 See Senate Report 111-176 (2010), p. 129.
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mezzanine tranche, or holding a vertical slice of all tranches may work best to align
interests. Other authors promote strict retention of the first-loss piece as the best
way for alignment of interests (Kiff and Kisser, 2010, 2012). The Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System (2010) concludes that simple credit risk retention
applied uniformly across assets of all type is unlikely to achieve an improvement of
the securitization process. Instead, the board favors type-specific requirements that
consider the different economics of different asset types. In this vein, my paper makes
a contribution to the analysis of the economics of mortgage securitizations.
3 Hypothesis Development
Empirical research points to two primary motives for securitizations by banks and
other firms. Banks undertake securitization transactions i) to obtain funding for their
business activities and/or ii) to tailor risk resulting from their on-balance-sheet assets.
My hypotheses build on these two motives for deriving the determinants of holding
retained interest in securitized assets.
Under the funding motive, banks use securitization to convert illiquid loans into
marketable securities in order to obtain cash proceeds from the investors in these
securities. At the start of this process, banks select some of their assets, pool them
and transfer them into a securitization vehicle. Usually, a bank has better information
than investors with regard to the quality of the pooled assets (Franke and Krahnen,
2007; Franke et al., 2012). As a result, investors will only be willing to purchase
the securities at a prohibitively low price because investors do not know whether
the pooled assets are actually of high or low quality (Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995).
This information asymmetry between banks and investors with regard to the quality
of the securitized assets leads to adverse selection. To resolve this problem, banks
must send a costly signal for the quality of the underlying assets. Landsman et al.
(2008) suggest that holding retained interest in a pool of securitized assets is one
way to signal the assets’ quality. The signal should be the stronger, the lower the
(perceived) quality of the pool of assets. Most often, banks securitize a part of their
loan portfolio and the most important determinant of the quality of a loan is its
underlying credit risk. Thus, in securitization of loans investors will assess the credit
risk of the transferred loans. The higher their assessment of credit risk, the more
costly must be the signal for the quality of the loans. This leads to the first hypothesis:
H1: Banks hold more retained interest when the securitized loans have higher credit
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risk, c.p.
Franke and Krahnen (2007) and Chen et al. (2008) among others argue that this
signal for the (credit) quality of the securitized loans also serves as a means to protect
investors against potential losses. Retained interest typically represents the first-loss
(or equity) piece in a securitization transaction. If the pooled loans perform poorly,
holders of retained interest will be the first to suffer losses. Holders of more senior
interest are protected against losses as long as there is more junior interest to absorb
losses. Thus, in a different explanation demand for retained interest would be due to
investor demand for some form of protection against potential losses. The source of
the potential losses can be adverse selection of the securitized loans. But the source
can also be a moral hazard problem. Pennacchi (1988) and Gorton and Pennacchi
(1995) suggest that when loans are transferred without any risk retention, banks would
lack the incentive to produce an efficient level of credit information and monitoring.
Both, adverse selection and moral hazard problems may then lead to high credit risk
of the securitized loans. Since credit risk is one of the most important sources for
potential losses, investors will demand more protection the higher the credit risk of
the securitized loans.
These problems of information asymmetry may be mitigated when a bank has
an established reputation for securitization transactions. Sufi (2007) and Ball et al.
(2008) show in the context of syndicated loans that the bank which is the lead arranger
retains less of a syndicated loan when it is more reputable. Franke et al. (2012)
observe higher retained interest in securitizations of bonds than in securitizations of
loans and presume that in the latter case orginators can reduce credit risk through
loan monitoring. They suggest that investors anticipate a strong monitoring effort of
the originator in securitizations of loans due to high reputation costs.
Such reputation considerations may force banks to pool primarily high quality
loans, to provide implicit recourse to securitization structures, and to exert a rea-
sonable amount of effort in loan screening and monitoring. Investors may therefore
perceive securities as less risky when the securitizing bank has an established reputa-
tion. Banks will then be able to hold a smaller amount of retained interest.9 Thus, a
9 In contrast, investors may demand additional protection when a bank securitizes rarely or when
it consummates a securitization transaction for the first time. For example, United Bankshares,
Inc. only once securitized a pool of $205million in 1999 to better manage the risk from the
underlying mortgages, see United Bankshares, Inc. (2000), p. 38. City Holding Company (not
to be confused with Citibank) completed six securitization transactions between 1997 and 1999
with a volume of about $760million before terminating its securitization program in 1999,
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banks’ reputation and reputational concerns will act as a substitute for the signaling
and/or protecting function of holding retained interest (Landsman et al., 2008). The
second hypothesis reflects this role of reputation:
H2: Banks with an established reputation for securitization transactions hold less
retained interest, c.p.
Reputational concerns can be merely abstract, meaning that a potential deterio-
ration of reputation would not have any economic effect. However, a reputation for
successful and smooth securitization transactions can well be of economic substance.
Having an established reputation means that securitization transactions are repeated
interactions with the market. When a bank relies on such repeated interactions to
obtain funding, it will depend on the market’s trust in its securitization products.
A deterioriation of reputation may then lead to a loss of trust in the securitization
products and a corresponding loss of funding. This may ultimately endanger the
bank as a going concern.
The relative importance of securitization as a source of funding depends on a bank’s
capital structure. Banks which rely more on deposit-based financing should not be
dependent on frequent securitization transactions to obtain funding. They should
be more likely to conduct securitizations as rare transactions in order to transfer a
group of particular assets from their balance sheet or to gain additional flexibility for
their liquidity management.10
When a bank does not depend on securitization to obtain funding, it will be able
to take more time for searching an investor in its asset-backed securities. It will also
have a stronger position when negotiating the terms of the transaction. It might even
be able to find a third-party investor which is willing to take the retained interest from
the securitization transaction or which buys the retained interest shortly after the
transaction. The portion of interest retained by a bank will thus be determined by the
extent to which a bank is forced to complete the securitization transaction in the near
term. An analysis of the determinants of retained interest should therefore control for
see City Holding Company (2002), p. 18. Republic Bancshares, Inc. securitized mortgages
of $300million in 1997 and 1998 and had only limited securitization activity afterwards, see
Republic Bancshares, Inc. (1999), p. 5. All these banks report rather high retained interest of
between 4.3 percent and 99.0 percent of the outstanding securitized loan volume.
10 For example, Regions Financial Corporation securitized mortgages only in 1998 and 1999
amounting to a total volume of about $1.8 billion. According to its 2001 annual report, these
securitizations gave Regions additional flexibility for funding purposes, see Regions Financial
Corporation (2002), p. 18.
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the extent to which a bank is forced to securitize. As this force is usually not directly
observable, an analysis of the determinants of retained interest has to use proxy
variables and should for example control for the relative importance of securitization-
based financing vs. other forms of funding, such as deposit-based financing. A-priori
it is difficult to predict the sign of such control variables. Banks with a strong deposit
base may be able to postpone the securitization transaction until market conditions
are favorable or until they have found a third-party investor in the retained interest.
This would lead to a negative relationship between deposit-based funding and the
holding of retained interest. However, some banks with a strong deposit base might
not be frequent securitizers. If a bank does not securitize frequently, investors could
be sceptical about the quality of the assets underlying a securitization transaction.
Investors would then demand the bank to hold additional retained interest in order
to protect the investors against adverse selection and moral hazard problems. In this
event, the relationship between deposit-based funding and retained interest could be
positive. However, it seems likely that banks with a strong deposit base will take
time to negotiate the terms of the transaction and to find investors willing to buy a
part of the most risky tranches. For this reason, I expect a negative influence of a
bank’s deposit base on the amount of retained interest held.
Another control for the relative importance of securitization-based financing vs.
other forms of funding would be the outstanding securitization volume. Banks
which have securitized high volumes of assets are likely to complete securitization
transactions frequently. It is likely that these banks have a routine for frequent and
smooth securitization transactions. If investors appreciate such frequent and smooth
securitization transactions, they might demand less retained interest held by the
securitizing bank. This would yield a negative relationship between outstanding
securitized volume and retained interest. In addition, some banks have – or better:
had – a business model in which they acquire assets to securitize them immediately
afterwards (Purnanandam, 2011). As part of this business model, the bank tries
to sell the retained interest in the secondary market to obtain additional liquidity
(Franke and Krahnen, 2008). Under this business model, there would also be a
negative relationship between outstanding securitized volume and retained interest.
While one motive for securitization is the need for funding, academic research has
shown that banks use securitization transactions also as a tool to tailor risk (Bannier
and Hänsel, 2008; Panetta and Pozzolo, 2010). Under the risk tailoring motive, banks
use securitization transactions to change their risk profile and feed their risk appetite.
Banks are exposed to different types and degrees of risk depending on the assets (and
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liabilities) they hold. To change these exposures banks can use securitization and
transfer some of the risks to another party. The effect on a bank’s risk profile will
depend on the type and degree of the risk transferred and on the type and amount
of retained interest. Risk transfer via securitization does not necessarily lead to a
lower risk exposure. Retained interest often represents a form of concentrated risk, in
particular if the first-loss piece is retained (see SFAS 140.59; Chen et al., 2008).
Such concentrated risk exposures might be very complex. For managing and
evaluating these exposures banks need to monitor prepayment speeds, discount rates
and rates of delinquency and default. Banks need also adequate valuation models,
which can be quite complex. Thus, monitoring retained interest can be a challenging
task for a bank’s risk management and it will usually be easier for more sophisticated
banks, such as large universal banks, to manage this task. Banks that already have a
good capability for managing interest rate risk, credit risk and other types of risk
will be better able to manage risk exposure from retained interest. Therefore, more
sophisticated banks might be willing to hold more retained interest. This leads to
the third hypothesis:
H3: More sophisticated banks hold more retained interest, c.p.
Taking risk is part of the normal business of banks. Almost all assets held by a
bank are more or less subject to different types of risk. The willingness to take risk is
determined by a bank’s risk appetite. Therefore, the willingness to hold a concentrated
risk exposure from retained interest will also depend on a bank’s risk appetite. Apart
from retained interest, banks have risk exposures from other assets such as loans.
Existing exposures from other assets will have an impact on a bank’s risk appetite.
This impact on a bank’s risk appetite will also affect the bank’s willingness to take
risk from retained interest. Consistent with this view, Casu et al. (2011) document a
negative relationship between banks’ outstanding securitization volumes and banks’
risk taking from other activities. Therefore, the amount of retained interest held by a
bank will be affected by its current risk exposure. If a bank is already exposed to
high risk, it will be less willing to accept additional or concentrated risk in the form
of retained interest.
For most banks, credit risk will be the most important type of risk (Herring and
Schuermann, 2005) and loans will be the largest and most obvious source of credit risk
(BCBS, 2000). Therefore, credit risk from loans will have the most important impact
on a bank’s risk appetite. In particular, the exposure to credit risk from loans should
determine the remaining appetite for risk from other assets. If a bank has a high
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exposure to credit risk from its loans, it will be less willing to take additional risk,
such as a concentrated risk position from retained interest. The fourth hypothesis
takes this into account:
H4: Banks hold less retained interest when they are exposed to higher credit risk
from their on-balance-sheet loans, c.p.
Put differently, banks with overall low risk can afford to take more risk from
securitizations and can afford to hold more retained interest. Banks in a stable
position will be less affected by potential losses from retained interest. They will be
able to meet investor demand for retained interest more easily and will have less of
an incentive to sell retained interest after the securitization transaction.
4 Sample Selection and Research Design
4.1 Data
One of the key challenges when analyzing securitization transactions is data availability.
Information about securitization transactions is not available from annual or quarterly
financial statements in a standardized form. Collection of such information is a
cumbersome task and often requires substantial judgement from researchers when
standardizing the data provided. For this reason, the data used for the empirical
analysis in this paper are obtained from FR Y-9C reports (bank holding company
reports). Bank holding companies have to file these reports when they have total
consolidated assets of $500million or more or meet certain other criteria.11 The
reports are filed quarterly on a consolidated basis with the Federal Reserve. Since
2001 these reports require detailed information about banks’ securitization activities,
including information about retained interest and delinquencies of securitized loans.
In line with related papers, I restrict my sample period to the years 2001 to 2006, in
order to exclude the onset of the financial crisis from the sample period.12 Because of
this restriction, it should be unlikely that observations are affected by crisis-related
effects.
In the FR Y-9C report, bank holding companies have to state the outstanding
principal balance of securitized assets for which servicing has been retained or for
11 The threshold of $500million has been effective since 2006. In the period before, the threshold
for the filing requirement was $150million.
12 See e.g. Chen et al. (2008); Barth et al. (2012) who also limit their sample period to 2001 to
2006.
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which recourse or some other form of credit enhancement has been provided by the
bank. The relevant schedule on securitization activities is to be completed on a
fully consolidated basis and includes only information on securitized assets that are
not reportable on the bank’s consolidated balance sheet.13 Securitized assets are
disaggregated into seven classes of assets. For this paper, the class of interest is "1–4
Family Residential Loans" which is commonly known as mortgages. The reported
amounts exclude mortgages sold to the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie
Mae) or the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac). Therefore, the
focus of this paper is on so called non-agency or private-label securitizations which
represent a major subgroup of all securitizations with an annual issuance volume of
about $900 billion during the boom period of 2005 to 2006.14
For the empirical analysis, I select only banks that report a non-zero balance of
outstanding securitized mortgages15 and exlude all other banks. In order to remove
subgroups, I exclude all banks that are controlled by another bank as indicated by the
highest holder identifier (data item RSSD9348). I truncate obvervations of continuous
variables at the 99th percentile to mitigate the effect of outliers.16 For scaling income
and expense items, I use net interest income. To prevent descriptive statistics from
being biased by outliers, I set net interest income to missing in quarters when it is
negative.17 This procedure leads to a final sample of 1,355 firm-quarter observations
from 164 bank holding companies.
Information on a bank holding company’s reputation is taken from The 2010
Mortgage Market Statistical Annual by Inside Mortgage Finance. The annual includes
a list of the top 25 issuers of non-agency mortgage-backed securities for every year of
the sample period. Consistent with studies on loan syndication,18 I consider a bank
to have an established reputation for securitization transactions if it has been among
the top 25 issuers during the sample period.
13 See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2001), HC-S-1.
14 See SIFMA (2012b).
15 In March 2002 the filing instructions for the FR Y-9C report clarified that securitizations
that have been accounted for as secured borrowings are to be excluded from the outstanding
principal balance of securitized mortgages and should continue to be carried as assets on the
balance sheet (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2002a; HC-S-3). So the
securitized mortgages in my sample include only mortgages that are not (longer) reported on
the balance sheet.
16 Results remain substantially unaffected if the truncation level is set to 99.5% or to 97.5% or if
the lower bound of the variables is also truncated.
17 This procedure eliminates scaled income and expense observations for two banks. It does not
affect the results of the multivariate analysis, because the multivariate analysis does not use
income and expense items.
18 See e.g. Ball et al. (2008).
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4.2 Empirical Design
Besides information about the amount of outstanding securitized mortgages, FR Y-9C
reports provide information about the nature and amount of recourse or other credit
enhancements provided in securitization transactions. In particular, the schedule on
securitization activities shows the maximum amount of credit exposure arising from
retained interst-only strips, from standby letters of credit, and from subordinated
securities and other enhancements. A separate line item discloses the unused portion
of a bank’s commitments to provide liquidity to securitization structures. For the
empirical analysis, I construct my dependent variable Retained Interest as the total of
all these types of recourse or other enhancements provided in mortgage securitizations
and scale the total by the bank’s amount of outstanding securitized mortgages.19
Information about most of the determinants of retained interest is also obtained
from the FR Y-9C reports. The variable for credit risk of the securitized mortgages
is Delinquent Securitized Mortgages. It is measured as the past due loan amount of
securitized mortgages scaled by the bank’s outstanding securitized mortgages.
A bank’s level of sophistication is usually difficult to measure. Liu et al. (2004) note
that "[m]ore technically sophisticated banks typically have larger trading portfolios
and may manage their trading and non-trading exposures differently than other
banks." Bank regulation requires bank holding companies with signifcant trading
activities to have a sophisticated risk management system. The Federal Reserve’s
minimum requirements for the risk management system include a risk control unit that
reports directly to senior management, a risk measurement model that is integrated
into the daily management process, appropriate stress tests and backtests and regular
reviews of the risk management system.20 Therefore, banks with a significant portion
of trading assets can be expected to be more technically sophisticated. In particular,
trading assets often comprise derivatives, which may require a sophisticated risk
management system. Accordingly, I use the variable Trading Assets, measured as
trading assets scaled by total assets, as a proxy for the level of sophistication of a
bank.21
19 Scaling by the amount of oustanding securitized mortgages requires that the amount of
outstanding securitized mortgages is non-zero because scaling by zero is not possible.
20 See Code of Federal Regulations (2012), Title 12, Pt. 225, App. E.
21 A possible issue with using trading assets as a proxy for the level of sophistication is that results
may be biased towards my hypothesis. Such a bias may follow if banks tend to classify retained
interest as trading assets. However, untabulated comparisons of retained interest with trading
assets show that retained interest is usually much smaller than trading assets. On average,
retained interest has only 21.7 percent of the size of trading assets, with a median of 0.0 percent.
An additional analysis of sample banks’ annual reports showed that only 15 percent of banks
classify retained interest as trading securities. So it seems unlikely that classification of retained
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For measuring credit risk from on-balance-sheet loans, I follow the approach in
other studies (e.g. Wahlen, 1995; Beaver and Engel, 1996; Harris et al., 2013) and
measure credit risk by Non Performing Loans. This variable is defined as the total of
loans and leases 90 or more days past due and loans and leases on nonaccrual status
scaled by the total of all loans and leases.
The dummy variable High Reputation indicates whether a bank has an established
reputation for securitization transactions. It is one if the bank holding company or one
of its subsidiaries has been among the top 25 issuers of non-agency mortgage-backed
securities in the years 2001 to 2006 and zero otherwise.
Total Assets is the natural logarithm of a bank’s total assets in thousand US-$.
I include this variable to control for any structural differences that could be related
to size.
To control for the relative importance of securitization-based financing vs. other
forms of funding, I include two additional variables. Deposits is the total of the bank’s
domestic and foreign deposits scaled by total assets. It measures the strength of the
bank’s deposits base and thus its independence from securitization transactions as
a source of funding. Outstanding Securitized Mortgages is the bank’s outstanding
principal balance of mortgages securitized for which servicing or recourse or other
credit enhancements have been retained. It is scaled by total assets and indicates
whether the bank has securitized a high volume of assets and might therefore have a
routine for frequent and smooth securitization transactions or whether the bank has
a business model under which it primarily acquires assets to securitize them.
In the empirical analysis, I use panel regression techniques to estimate the relation
between retained interest and my measures of credit risk, reputation, sophistication
and exposure to risk from on-balance-sheet loans. The base model is:
Retained Interestit = β0 + β1Delinquent Securitized Mortgagesit
+ β2High Reputation+ β3Trading Assetsit
+ β4Non Performing Loansit + γ Controlsit + it
(1)
I start with fixed-effects regressions to control for unobserved fixed heterogeneity
across sample banks. High Reputation is identified as a dummy variable that does
not vary over time and thus is by definition a fixed effect. For this reason, I run
interest as trading assets drives the results.
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random-effects regressions for all specifications of the model that include the dummy
High Reputation.
5 Results
5.1 Univariate Analysis
Table 1 presents the distribution of total retained interest, of the components of
retained interest and of the bank- and loan-specific variables which are used as proxies
for the determinants of retained interest. The mean bank has Retained Interest of
4.4 percent of its outstanding securitized mortgages. The median of Retained Interest
is only 0.0 percent. These results are somewhat smaller than the level of retention
reported by Chen et al. (2008). However, in their study the authors use a different
sample selection procedure and report winsorized rather than truncated data. The
distribution of Retained Interest is more similar to Chen et al. (2008) when I also
winsorize the data.
Subordinated ABS, standby letters of credit and other enhancements are the
largest component of Retained Interest with a mean (median) of 3.2 (0.0) percent. In
the FR Y-9C reporting form, this aggregate class of retained interest was split into
two separate classes in December 2003. Accordingly, the number of observations for
these two separate classes is lower. The disaggregation shows that subordinated ABS
are the most important type of retained interest with a mean (median) of 2.0 (0.0)
percent.
A large fraction of sample banks do not report any retained interest at all. This
result is unexpected, because banks should have to retain interest in securitized
mortgages due to the information asymmetry problems discussed in Section 3. A
large fraction of observations with zero retained interest might raise some technical
issues in the regression analysis, therefore the sensitivity analysis in Subsection 5.4
will deal with this finding in more detail.
[Insert Table 1 here]
Table 1 also reports the distribution of the bank- and loan-specific variables which
are used as proxies for the determinants of retained interest. On average (median),
2.7 (0.1) percent of outstanding securitized mortgages are delinquent, i.e. contractual
payments on these mortgages are due and unpaid for 30 days or more. Among the
five percent of sample banks with the highest portion of delinquent mortgages is e.g.
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Provident Financial Group. This bank is chosen as an example because it documented
its securitization activities well in its 10-K statement and amounts can easily be
compared to the FR Y-9C report. For the year ended December 31, 2001, Provident
presented a value of 23.27 percent of Delinquent Securitized Mortgages. This was
accompanied by a value of Retained Interest of 11.62 percent, which is well above the
average retained interest reported in the sample.22 The observation of a high portion
of delinquent mortgages, my measure of credit risk, and a high portion of retained
interest is in line with the argument expressed in Hypothesis 1 that banks hold more
retained interest when the securitized mortgages have higher credit risk.
High Reputation has a mean of 12.8 percent. This is the portion of sample banks
which belong to the top 25 issuers of non-agency mortgage-backed securities and
are considered as having a high reputation for securitization transactions. Trading
Assets have a mean (median) of 1.3 (0.0) percent. Overall, this asset class is of minor
importance. For example, Provident Financial Group reports trading assets to total
assets of only 0.6 percent, which is still above the 70th percentile. However, the bank
explains in its 10-K statement that
Provident enters into swaps to synthetically alter the repricing characteris-
tics of specific assets, liabilities and off-balance sheet loan securitizations.23
So, there is some anecdotal evidence that banks actively manage the risk arising from
securitizations. Derivatives are a common tool for risk management and derivatives
are included in trading assets. These assets require a sophisticated system for risk
measuring and monitoring. This supports the approach to use Trading Assets as the
proxy for the level of a bank’s sophistication.
Mean (median) Non Performing Loans are 1.0 (0.8) percent. These figures
generally compare to prior studies (e.g. Cantrell et al., 2013; Harris et al., 2013).
Sample banks vary substantially with regard to size and their funding models. The
average (median) bank has total assets of $4,561 ($5,032)million.24 Deposits are the
most important source of funding with a mean (median) of 68.8 (71.0) percent of total
22 In its 10-K statement for the year ended December 31, 2001, Provident Financial Group discloses
a ratio of mortgages 90 days or more delinquent to total managed assets, which is 13.85 percent.
In the FR Y-9C report the ratio of mortgages 90 days or more delinquent to outstanding
securitized mortgages is 16.09 percent. Explanations for the difference of 2.24 percent include
differences in the numerator, which may include delinquent amounts from other managed – but
not securitized – assets in the 10-K statement, and differences in the denominator, which is
not the amount of outstanding securitized mortgages in the 10-K statement. See Provident
Financial Group, Inc. (2002), p. 62.
23 See Provident Financial Group, Inc. (2002), p. 63.
24 The variable Total Assets is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets in thousand US-$.
A value of 15.333 corresponds to e15.333 = $4,560,760 thousand or $4,561million.
18
assets. The bank with the smallest observation of Deposits is Countrywide Financial
Corporation with a value of 7.7 percent in March 2003. Countrywide funded its
operations primarily through securitization transactions. It is also the bank with the
highest value of Outstanding Securitized Mortgages with a ratio of 259.3 percent of
securitized mortgages to total assets in June 2006. This is much larger than the mean
(median) of Outstanding Securitized Mortgages, which is only 13.8 (3.1) percent. The
bank with the maximum value of Deposits is Commerce Bancorp, Inc. For this bank,
deposits are 90.6 percent of total assets in September 2001.
The substantial variation with regard to the asset and funding structure of sample
banks is the result of different business models and might also affect the level of
retained interest held by a bank. In order to capture differences in the holding of
retained interest across different business models, I perform a k-means cluster analysis
to define different groups of banks according to their business model. The variables
that I use for clustering control for the different asset and funding structures of banks.
In particular, I use on-balance-sheet mortgages, consumer loans, commercial and
other loans, securities, trading assets and deposits, all of which are scaled by total
assets. I also use the securitization ratio as a clustering variable, which is the ratio of
the bank’s outstanding securitized mortgages divided by on-balance-sheet mortgages.
This ratio helps to identify banks which primarily acquire mortgages in order to
securitize them immediately afterwards.
The clustering procedure results in four different types of banks: originate-to-
distribute (OTD) banks, universal banks, diversified commercial banks, and traditional
commercial banks. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for bank- and loan specific
variables by bank type. OTD banks have an originate-to-distribute business model
under which they originate or purchase mortgages in order to securitize them immedi-
ately afterwards (Purnanandam, 2011). Examples of OTD banks include Countrywide
and Doral Financial Corporation. These banks are large with mean total assets of
$81.90 billion.25 Mortgages represent on average 41 percent of the assets of these
banks. Consistent with the originate-to-distribute business model, OTD banks have
the highest portion of Loans Held for Sale with 17 percent on average. These banks
also have the highest portion of trading assets with a mean of 7 percent. With regard
to their funding strategy, OTD banks rely primarily on short-term liabilities, such as
repurchase agreements and federal funds purchased with a mean of 23 percent or Other
Liabilities with a mean of 28 percent. Deposits are of relatively minor importance
for OTD banks when compared with other types of banks. The mean of Deposits is
25 For ease of presentation I do not discuss median values here
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only 36 percent for OTD banks. The loan portfolio of these banks appears riskier
than those of other bank types, because Non Performing Loans are on average higher
with 2 percent of total loans. OTD banks generate primarily noninterest income from
securitization transactions and the sale of loans. 53 percent of OTD banks have an
established reputation for securitization transactions. On average, these banks have
outstanding securitized mortgages of 3.31 times their on-balance-sheet mortgages
and of 1.37 times their total assets. The mean of mortgages that these banks service
for another party is 2.19 times their total assets. These values reflect the nature of
the OTD business model. It also seems that OTD banks securitize particularly risky
mortgages. The mean of mortgages that are 30 or more days past due is 6 percent of
outstanding securitized mortgages. Despite the relatively high risk of the securitized
mortgages, OTD banks hold on average only 3 percent Retained Interest, which is
smaller than the mean of Retained Interest for the entire sample. There are two
explanations for this observation of relatively low Retained Interest. First, OTD
banks often have an established reputation for securitization transactions and are
therefore able to hold less retained interest. Second, OTD banks sell retained interest
to the secondary market (Franke and Krahnen, 2008; Fender and Mitchell, 2009b).
[Insert Table 2 here]
The second type of banks are universal banks, which are the largest banks with
a mean of total assets of $154.64 billion. Universal banks invest in different asset
classes such as mortgages with on average 31 percent, commercial and other loans
with on average 16 percent, and securities with on average 28 percent of total assets.
The mean of Trading Assets is 3 percent for universal banks, which is well above
the average for the entire sample. The funding structure of universal banks relies
more on deposits, which represent on average 58 percent of total assets. Short-term
liabilities like Repos & FedFunds Purchased or Other Liabilities are significantly
smaller than for OTD banks with means of 11 percent and 17 percent, respectively.
Net interest income is slightly higher for universal banks than for OTD banks with a
mean of 9 percent of book value of equity. At the same time, universal banks generate
significant noninterest income, which is on average 71 percent of net interest income.
The different sources of income for universal banks show the sophistication of these
banks. Universal banks generate a part of their income from sophisticated business
activities, such as investment banking with a mean of 19 percent or trading with
a mean of 3 percent of net interest income. Other activities like servicing (mean:
2 percent), securitization transactions (mean: 2 percent) and loan sales (mean: 2
percent) are also important sources of income. Securitization transactions do not
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appear as a major source of funding for these banks. The Securitization Ratio has
a mean of 11 percent, Mortgages Serviced for Others has a mean of 9 percent and
Outstanding Securitized Mortgages has a mean of 3 percent. 21 percent of universal
banks have an established reputation for securitization transactions. Universal banks
securitize slightly riskier mortgages. The mean of Delinquent Securitized Mortgages
is 4 percent, which is above the value for the entire sample. Universal banks hold
the highest portion of retained interest with a mean of 9 percent of outstanding
securitized mortgages. This high level of retained interest might be driven by the
credit risk of the securitized mortgages. However, when compared to the retained
interest held by OTD banks, it seems likely that universal banks do not only hold
retained interest because of the credit risk of their securitized mortgages. It might
be possible that large, sophisticated banks are more willing to hold retained interest
because they are better able to manage the risk from these positions.
The third type of banks are diversified commercial banks. These banks invest into
different asset classes like mortgages with a mean of 39 percent, commercial and other
loans with a mean of 13 percent and securities with a mean of 25 percent of total
assets. For their funding, diversified commercial banks rely primarily on deposits
with a mean of 67 percent, but they also use securitization transactions on a large
scale, so that Outstanding Securitized Mortgages have a mean of 30 percent. As a
result of their diversified business activities, these banks generate a significant part of
their income from sophisticated activities like trading with a mean of 5 percent or
investment banking and brokerage services with 17 percent of net interest income.
Income from servicing (mean: 4 percent) and from the sale of loans (mean: 7 percent)
are more important than for universal banks. It seems that diversified commercial
banks perform securitization transactions to obtain additional funding flexibility. The
Securitization Ratio has a mean of 78 percent, while Mortgages Serviced for Others
are on average 61 percent. The credit risk of the securitized mortgages is below
average with a mean of 2 percent for Delinquent Securitized Mortgages. Diversified
commercial banks hold below average retained interest with a mean of 2 percent of
oustanding securitized mortgages. The explanation for this below-average level of
retained interest could be the below-average credit risk of the securitized mortgages
and the established reputation of these banks for securitization transactions. High
Reputation has a mean of 25 percent.
The fourth type of banks are traditional commercial banks. These banks have the
highest portion of mortgage loans with a mean of 51 percent of total assets. Securities
with a mean of 19 percent and Trading Assets with a mean of 0 percent are substantially
smaller than for all other types of banks. At the same time, traditional commercial
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banks are almost completely funded by deposits which represent on average 75 percent
of total assets. All other sources of funding, including securitization transactions, are
less important. Total Noninterest Income is much smaller than for all other banks with
a mean of 37 percent. Servicing Income has a mean of 1 percent and Securitization
Income has a mean of 0 percent. It appears that traditional commercial banks use
securitization transactions only as a tool to tailor their risk profile and not as a source
of funding. Consistently, only 3 percent of traditional commercial banks have an
established reputation for securitization transactions, the Securitization Ratio is on
average only 7 percent and outstanding securitized mortgages represent on avergage
only 4 percent of total assets. Traditional commercial banks securitize less risky
mortgages, the mean of Delinquent Securitized Mortgages is 2 percent. Surprisingly,
Retained Interest is 4 percent in the mean, but only 0 percent in the median. The
distribution of Retained Interest for these banks is skewed by a few outliers, which hold
a high percentage of Retained Interest from securitization transactions that had only
insignificant volumes. The explanation for this high percentage of Retained Interest
could be that these banks do not have an established reputation for securitization
transactions and, therefore, investors are sceptical about the quality of the securitized
mortgages despite average low Delinquent Securitized Mortgages.26
Table 3 presents Pearson correlations coefficients for the dependent variable and the
bank- and loan-specific characteristics. As expected, Retained Interest is positively
correlated with the measure of credit risk, Delinquent Securitized Mortgages. Contrary
to the argument discussed in the hypothesis development, Retained Interest is weakly
positively correlated with the measure of bank reputation. However, there is a strong
positive correlation between reputation and bank size (coefficient of 0.587), which
might influence the correlation between Retained Interest and High Reputation in
a univariate analysis. The correlation of Retained Interest and the proxy for banks’
sophistication, Trading Assets, is positive as expected. The correlation of Retained
Interest and Non Performing Loans is positive, but not significantly different from
zero. It seems that, in a univariate analysis, risk exposure from other assets does
not have a strong influence on the amount of Retained Interest held. Results may
differ when in a multivariate analysis other factors are controlled for. There is also a
positive correlation between Retained Interest and Total Assets, indicating that larger
banks hold more retained interest. The correlations of Retained Interest with each of
26 It is also possible that these banks use QSPEs in their securitization structures and initially
retain all of the securities that result from the securitization transactions. The banks then sell
the securities when market conditions are favorable.
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the two control variables for a bank’s funding structure, Deposits and Outstanding
Securitized Mortgages, are negative as expected.
[Insert Table 3 here]
5.2 Multivariate Analysis
To be conservative, I evaluate significance using two-tailed tests despite the fact that
my hypotheses are directional. In a two-tailed test, a 10 percent significance level
corresponds to a 5 percent significance level in a one-tailed test.
Table 4 presents results for regressions of Retained Interest on bank- and loan-
specific characteristics. Each regression is a different specification of Model 1, the base
model. The line under the specification number indicates whether the specification
is a fixed-effects ("FE") or random-effects ("RE") regression. In every specification,
standard errors are clustered at the firm level and quarter-fixed effects are included.
Regression (1) examines only the effect of credit risk of the securitized mortgages
and controls on Retained Interest. The coefficient on Delinquent Securitized Mortgages
is 0.632. It is positive and significant at the 10 percent level. This results is in line with
Hypothesis 1 and provides some first evidence that banks hold more retained interest
when the securitized mortgages have higher credit risk. The signs of the control
variables are also in line with the predictions derived in the hypothesis development,
but the coefficients are not statistically different from zero.
In order to gauge the economic significance of the relation between Delinquent
Securitized Mortgages and Retained Interest, I draw on the estimates of Regression (1).
The mean bank has Delinquent Securitized Mortgages of 2.7 percent. Given a
coefficient estimate of 0.632 for this variable, the mean bank has to hold Retained
Interest of about 1.7 percent due to the portion of delinquent mortgages among its
outstanding securitized mortgages.27
Regression (2) includes High Reputation as an additional explanatory variable
and reports the estimates from a random-effects model. In the definition that I
use the dummy for bank reputation is time-invariant and cannot be included in a
fixed-effects model. The coefficient on High Reputation is negative, but not significant
in this specification. This result provides only weak evidence for Hypothesis 2 that
banks with an established reputation for securitization transactions hold less retained
interest. However, the result becomes stronger in the subsequent specifications. The
27 The amount of Retained Interest for the mean bank equals 0.027 (mean of Delinquent Securitized
Mortgages) x 0.632 (coefficient estimate) = 0.017064.
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coefficient on Delinquent Securitized Mortgages is slightly larger than in Regression
(1) and is now significant at the 1 percent level.
Regression (3) introduces Trading Assets as the measure of bank sophistication into
the regression. Although the estimated coefficient is not significant at conventional
levels (p-value 0.164), it is positive as predicted in Hypothesis 3. To the extent that
the portion of trading assets is a valid proxy for the sophistication of a bank, it seems
that more sophisticated banks with a better ability to manage risk are willing to hold
more retained interest. The coefficient on Delinquent Securitized Mortgages is again
positive and significant at the 1 percent level. The magnitude of the coefficient on
High Reputation increases and the coefficient is now significantly negative at the 5
percent level, which supports the argument that banks with an established reputation
hold less retained interest. The control variables have the same sign as in the previous
two specifications, but are statistically insignifcant.
Regression (4) includes the measure of risk exposure arising from other assets,
Non Performing Loans. The coefficient is negative and significant at the 5 percent
level. This result is consistent with Hypothesis 4 and suggests a negative relationship
between retained interest and risk exposure from other assets. This observation is
different from the result in the univariate analysis, which reported a weakly positive
correlation coefficient between Retained Interest and Non Performing Loans, but
which did not control for other factors. In addition, the coefficient on Delinquent
Securitized Mortgages is significantly positive at the 1 percent level and the coefficient
on High Reputation is significantly negative at the 5 percent level. For trading assets
the estimated coefficient is slightly larger than in the previous specification and is
now close to significance at conventional levels (p-value 0.124). This specification
of Model 1 has an Overall R2 of 18.0 percent and a Chi2-statistic of 100.696 which
indicate that the model has reasonable explanatory power for the amount of retained
interest held from mortgage securitizations.
[Insert Table 4 here]
An alternative explanation for the positive association of Retained Interest and
Trading Assets could be that the positive coefficient on Trading Assets is simply
the result of differences in the business model of banks. In order to control for the
effect of different business models, Regression (5) introduces dummy variables for
the different types of banks. The dummy variables are based on the types of banks
defined in Subsection 5.1. Traditional commercial banks are the benchmark group in
this specification. The estimated coefficients on the dummy variables are in line with
the observations in Subsection 5.1. In particular, OTD banks seem to hold a relatively
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small amount of retained interest, while universal banks seem to hold a larger fraction
of the interest in the securitized mortgages. Diversified commercial banks hold on
average less retained interest. However, none of the estimated coefficients for the
dummy variables is significant. More importantly, introducing the dummy variables
for banks’ business models does not materially change the coefficients and significance
levels of Delinquent Securitized Mortgages, High Reputation and Non Performing
Loans. The coefficient on Trading Assets even increases and is only marginally
insignificant (p-value 0.111). Therefore, it seems that the positive association between
Retained Interest and Trading Assets is not driven by differences across banks’ business
models. This result supports the interpretation that Trading Assets is a proxy for the
bank’s level of sophistication and that bank sophistication is positively associated
with the amount of retained interest held.
Finally, Regression (6) reports estimates for a fixed-effects model that excludes all
dummy variables. This specification serves as a sensitivity check of the results to any
unobserved fixed-effects. The coefficient on Delinquent Securitized Mortgages is now
0.678, which is slightly smaller than the coefficients estimated in the random-effects
Regressions (2) to (5). The coefficient is significant at the 5 percent level. This result
provides further support for Hypohesis 1 that credit risk of the securitized assets is
positively associated with the amount of retained interest held. The coefficient on
Trading Assets is 0.844, which is larger than in the previous specifications. It has
the predicted positive sign and is now significant at the 1 percent level. Therefore,
it seems that there are some unobserved fixed effects which in the random-effects
regressions bias the coefficient on Trading Assets downwards. The results from the
fixed-effects regression provide additional evidence that more sophisticated banks
hold more retained interest. Risk exposure from other assets, as measured by Non
Performing Loans continues to have a negative association with the amount of retained
interest held. The coefficient is -1.545 and is significant at the 5 percent level.
5.3 Analysis of Additional Determinants
5.3.1 Earnings Management
Some studies have analyzed the potential and use of securitization transactions for
earnings management (see e.g. Bryan et al., 2010). Karaoglu (2005) provides evidence
that banks use gains from securitization transactions to smooth earnings. However,
it is unclear whether securitizations are an effective tool for earnings management.
In Karaoglu (2005) income from securitization transactions has a mean (median) of
0.20 percent (0.06 percent) of total regulatory capital. In my study, Table 2 reports
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a mean (median) for income from securitization transactions scaled by net interest
income of 7 percent (2 percent) for OTD banks, for all other banks it is substantially
smaller. It does not seem likely that these relatively small amounts help much to
smooth earnings.
Dechow and Shakespeare (2009) report that most securitization transactions occur
at the end of a quarter and suggest that window-dressing the financial statements
appears to be a valuable side-benefit of securitization transactions. Dechow et al.
(2010) investigate whether for firms with strong corporate governance mechanisms
CEO compensation is less sensitive to securitization income than to other sources
of income and do not find that better "monitoring" reduces earnings management.
However, as Barth and Taylor (2010) note, the reason for the observation of earnings
management in Dechow et al. (2010) could be a mechanical negative correlation
between securitization income and net income before securitization income for firms
that use securitization transactions on a large scale. If a firm earns most of its income
from securitization transactions, it is likely that its net income before securitization
income will be negative.
To address incentives for earnings management in securitization transactions, I
extend Model 1 to include indicators for earnings management. Model 2 shows the
model for the analysis of earnings management incentives:
Retained Interestit = β0 + β1Delinquent Securitized Mortgagesit
+ β2High Reputation+ β3Trading Assetsit
+ β4Non Performing Loansit + γ Controlsit
+ δ D.EM + it
(2)
D.EM represents a dummy variable that indicates incentives for earnings man-
agement in a given bank-quarter. I use six different dummy variables that capture
different situations in which banks may have an incentive to engage in earnings man-
agement, in particular in earnings smoothing. Table 5 shows descriptive statistics for
the dummy variables. D.Loss before SecInc is one if net income before securitization
income is negative and zero otherwise. When managers face a loss from net income
before securitization income, they have an incentive to perform additional securitiza-
tion transactions or to overstate the value of retained interest. If managers smooth
reported net income by overstating retained interest in quarters with a negative net
income before securitization income, the value of retained interest in such quarters
should be higher than in other quarters. In the presence of earnings smoothing, the
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coefficient of D.Loss before SecInc should therefore be positive.
D.Loss Avoided is one if net income before securitization income is negative and,
at the same time, net income after securitization income is positive and zero otherwise.
This dummy indicates bank-quarters where securitization income was sufficient to
turn a pre-securitization loss into a post-securitization profit. If managers avoid the
loss by overstating the retained interest from securitization transactions, this dummy
should have a positive coefficient.
D.Quarterly (Annual) Decrease before SecInc is one if net income before securiti-
zation income has decreased from the prior quarter (the prior year’s quarter) to the
current quarter and zero otherwise. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) provide evidence
that firms manage reported net income to avoid decreases of net income. Net income
from the prior quarter (prior year’s quarter) usually represents a benchmark that
managers would like to beat. If managers overstate retained interest from securitiza-
tion transactions to smooth decreases of net income, the coefficient of this dummy
should be positive.
Similarly, D.Quarterly (Annual) Decrease Avoided is one if net income before
securitization income has decreased from the prior quarter (prior year’s quarter) to
the current quarter and net income after securitization income has increased and
zero otherwise. This dummy indicates bank-quarters where securitization income was
sufficient to avoid a decrease of net income. In the presence of earnings smoothing,
the coefficient of this dummy should be positive.
Table 6 presents results from random-effects regressions of Model 2 using the
different dummies for earnings management incentives. The estimated coefficients
for the other explanatory variables remain substantially the same as in Regression
(4) of Table 4. However, the estimated coefficients on the earnings management
indicators are all insignificant. The coefficients on D.Loss before SecInc, D.Loss
Avoided, D.Quarterly Decrease before SecInc, D.Annual Decrease before SecInc and
D.Annual Decrease Avoided are negative, which is contrary to the predicted incentives
for earnings smoothing in these bank-quarters. Only the coefficient on D.Quarterly
Decrease Avoided havs the expected positive sign, but it is statistically not different
from zero (p-value 0.572).
Overall, I do not find evidence for earnings management through overstating the
value of retained interest from securitization transactions. This result is consistent
with average small securitization income that generally does not help much to smooth
net income.
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5.3.2 Regulatory Arbitrage
Some authors (e.g. Calomiris and Mason, 2004) argue that banks engage in securiti-
zation transactions to lower their risk-weighted assets in order to achieve relief for
their regulatory capital. This behavior is usually referred to as regulatory arbitrage.
Such regulatory arbitrage is successful if the regulatory capital requirement after
the securitization transaction is lower then it was before. The net impact on the
regulatory capital requirement depends on the treatment of the specific securitization
transaction for regulatory capital purposes. This treatment is complex. It depends
on the type of exposure that the bank retains as a result of the credit enhancement
provided to the transaction.28
The Federal Reserve’s regulatory capital guidelines distinguish between those
exposures that qualify for the ratings-based approach and those exposures that do
not qualify. Generally speaking, an exposure qualifies for the ratings-based approach
if it receives an external rating. For those exposures that qualify for the ratings-
based approach, the required amount of risk-based capital is determined based on
the relative risk of the exposure as measured by the rating category. For all other
exposures, the regulatory capital guidelines distinguish between exposures in the form
of on-balance-sheet assets29 and exposures that do not result in on-balance-sheet assets
(e.g., recourse obligations which may have an associated on-balance-sheet liability).
All exposures in the form of on-balance-sheet assets are subject to a dollar-for-dollar
requirement of risk-based capital. For all other forms of exposure, the low-level
exposure rule applies. According to this rule, the required risk-based capital is the
lesser of i) the maximum contractual loss that could result from the exposure less any
associated recourse liability, or ii) the risk-based capital required to be held against
the outstanding securitized assets if they were still on the bank’s balance sheet.
Retained interest represents the first-loss piece in a securitization transaction. This
tranche is subordinated to all other tranches and often is not rated. For this reason,
most retained interest should not be eligible for the ratings-based approach. Moreover,
Table 1 shows that retained interest is most often in the form of subordinated ABS,
i.e. retained interest is most often an on-balance-sheet asset. Therefore, retained
interest is subject to a dollar-for-dollar charge to risk-based capital.
Given that retained interest should generally be subject to a dollar-for-dollar
28 See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2002b), GL-53, for a summary of the
regulatory capital treatment.
29 The regulatory capital guidelines use the term residual interest which is more narrow than
the term retained interest used in this paper; see Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (2002a), H-C-21 and 22.
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charge to risk-based capital, securitizers should have an incentive to retain less
interest when they are less capitalized. However, in untabulated regressions there is
no systematic association between the level of retained interest and the risk-based
capital ratios. One possible explanation might be that banks achieve net capital
relief by entering into the securitization transactions. When regulatory capital is
released for the securitized assets, the net impact after taking into account the capital
requirement for retained interst can still be positive for banks. This may lead to
an ambiguous influence of regulatory capital considerations on the level of retained
interest.
5.4 Sensitivity Analysis
A large fraction of sample banks do not report any retained interest at all. This
result is unexpected, because banks should be forced to retain interest in securitized
mortgages due to the information asymmetry problems discussed in Section 3. There
could be several reasons why many banks present zero amounts of retained interest.
The schedule on securitization activities in the FR Y-9C report may not capture
all possible forms of credit enhancements. For example, over-collateralization or the
installation of a reserve account could be forms of credit enhancement that do not
lead to a credit exposure reportable in the schedule of securitization activities. It is
also possible that some banks obtained third-party guarantees for which fees are paid
from current interest collections.30 Landsman et al. (2008) describe several possible
forms of credit enhancements, including over-collateralization, third-party insurance
or guarantees, retained interest and implicit recourse. They claim that typically the
originator provides the bulk of the credit enhancement because third-party credit
enhancement is likely to suffer from information asymmetry problems. Third parties
will only be willing to offer such guarantees at a prohibitively high cost, reducing the
incentive to use securitization as a means to issue debt. Based on this argument, it
seems unlikely that the reason for the large number of observations with zero retained
interest is due to third-party guarantees. Another explanation would be that banks
sold their retained interest subsequent to securitization. Fender and Mitchell (2009a)
argue that over time relatively active markets for first-loss pieces developed, allowing
originators to sell their retained interest. Last but not least, the observation that some
banks do not hold retained interest could be in line with the hypotheses developed in
this paper. Therefore, the sensitivity analysis in this section will separately examine
30 For a discussion of the different forms of credit enhancements and their cost and benefits see
Kothari (2006), pp. 291-230.
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the group of banks which hold positive amounts of retained interest.
Table 7 presents results for estimates of Model 1 using a subsample of banks
and using different regression techniques, respectively. The first two columns report
estimates for the subsample of banks with positive amounts of Retained Interest.
Results for the random-effects model are reported in the column RI Banks only: RE
and generally compare to the results for the full sample from Table 4. As predicted,
the coefficients on Delinquent Securitized Mortgages and Trading Assets are positive
and significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. Consistent with Hypotheses
2 and 4, the coefficients on High Reputation and Non Performing Loans are negative
as predicted and also significant at the 10 percent and 5 percent level, respectively.
With regard to the control variables, all coefficients have the same sign as in Table 4
except for the coefficient on Total Assets, which is now slightly negative, but neither
economically nor statistically significant. The R2 in this specification is 12.5 percent
suggesting a decent explanatory power.
The second column of Table 7 RI Banks only: FE presents estimates from a
fixed-effects regression for the subsample of banks with positive amounts of Retained
Interest. Results are similar to estimates for the full sample as reported in Table 4.
Only the coefficient on Deposits has changed its sign, but is still not statistically
significant. The model has an R2 of 13 percent. This is somewhat higher than the
R2 for the full sample, reflecting the exclusion of the observations with zero retained
interest.
The third column Tobit reports results from a tobit regression of Model 1. Tobit
models are suitable for datasets with corner solution responses. In the dataset of
this paper, the large fraction of banks with zero retained interest represents a corner
solution. Therefore, I estimate a tobit model with a lower limit of zero to analyze
the determinants of retained interest. The coefficient estimates have all the expected
sign. My measure of credit risk, Delinquent Securitized Mortgages has a coefficient of
1.572 and is significant at the 1 percent level. As predicted, the coefficient on High
Reputation is negative and significant at the 1 percent level. Moreover, Trading assets
have a positive coefficient, which however is not significant at conventional levels.
The coefficient on Non Performing Loans is negative as expected and statistically
significant at the 10 percent level. The coefficients on the control variables also have
the predicted signs. These results additionally support my hypotheses about the
determinants of retained interest.
As an additional robustness check, the fourth column 2 Cluster presents estimates
for an OLS regression of Model 1 with standard errors clustered by firm and quarter
to correct for cross-sectional and time-series correlation of error terms. For most of
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the variables, the coefficients are not statistically significant in this specification. One
exception is the coefficient on Delinquent Securitized Mortgages which is positive
and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. In addition, the signs of all other
variables including the controls are as predicted. For High Reputation and Non
Performing Loans the estimated coefficients are close to significance at conventional
levels (two-sided p-values of 10.3 percent and 12.3 percent, respectively). Therefore,
the results from this sensitivity analysis provide at least some evidence consistent
with the developed hypotheses about the determinants of retained interest.
Finally, the last column of Table 7 reports results from a regression of Model 1 using
an alternative definition of the dummy for an established reputation for securitization
transactions. This test serves as a robustness check of the definition of High Reputation.
The dummy Mkt Share is one if the bank’s share of the total issuance volume of
non-agency mortgage-backed securities is at least 2 percent in any year of the sample
period, otherwise the dummy is zero. Results generally compare to the estimates
reported in Table 4. The coefficients on Delinquent Securitized Mortgages and Trading
Assets are significantly positive at the 1 percent and 10 percent level, respectively.
More importantly, the alternative dummy for bank reputation Mkt Share is negative
as expected and significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level. In addition,
Non Performing Loans have a negative coefficient which is significant at the 5 percent
level. These results are again consistent with my hypotheses about the determinants
of retained interest.
[Insert Table 7 here]
5.5 Caveats
My research findings are subject to a number of limitations. The presumably severest
of them relates to the type of data used to test the hypotheses. Retained interest
is the result of a securitization transaction that occurs at a certain point in time.
At this point in time, the originating bank retains a portion of the securitized
assets. Because securitizations and the accompanying creation of retained interest
are discrete transactions, it would be more appropriate to use transaction level data
to examine the determinants of retained interest. In contrast, the data used in this
study are taken from quarterly balance sheets and thus are static. Based on this
static dataset, the results of this study provide evidence on the combined decision to
retain interest from a securitization transaction and the decision to hold such retained
interest in subsequent periods. A possible remedy would be to use transaction level
data. There are databases which collect issuance of new ABS, but it would still
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be difficult to identify which portion of the issuance volume is retained interest.
Such information would need to be hand collected from the security prospectus.
Hand-collected data would be subject to substantial judgement when standardizing
the different information from different prospectuses. It could also be subject to
a selection bias because there might be private placements of ABS with no public
prospectus available.
Besides, it is possible that there is an identification issue in the empirical design of
the study. Conclusions based on the empirical analysis hold only if the used variables
are valid proxies for the theoretical determinants of retained interest. In particular,
the validity of my findings depends on the extent that e.g. the portion of delinquent
amounts in securitized mortgages is a valid proxy for the credit risk of the securitized
mortgages. Similarly, the portion of trading assets needs to be a valid proxy for
a bank’s sophistication. In order to mitigate potential identification issues, I used
different proxies for the theoretical determinants in untabulated regressions. The
results remained substantially unaffected. However, except for net charge-offs of
securitized mortgages there is currently no other variable that could be used as a
proxy for credit risk of the securitized mortgages. I consider this a minor problem,
since past due amounts are a common proxy for credit risk of loans in other studies
(see e.g. Purnanandam, 2011).
6 Conclusions
This paper analyzes bank- and loan-specific characteristics that determine the amount
of retained interest held by US banks in mortgage securitizations. Securitization
transactions usually take place under information asymmetry between securitizers
and investors in asset-backed securities. Economic theory suggests that retaining an
interest in securitization transactions should help to mitigate information asymmetry
problems. Such retained interest represents a concentrated and often complex exposure
to the risks of the transferred assets. Therefore, the level of retained interest should
be positively associated with the credit risk of the securitized mortgages and with
the level of sophistication of a bank. In addition, a high reputation for securitization
transactions should also mitigate information asymmetry problems, while banks
with already high risk exposures from other assets, in particular credit risk exposure
from loans, should have less of an incentive to hold retained interest. The last two
characteristics should therefore be negatively associated with the level of retained
interest.
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Using a sample of US bank holding companies for the period 2001 to 2006, I
provide evidence consistent with these hypotheses. In random-effects and fixed-effects
regressions of retained interest, my measures of credit risk of the securitized mortgages
and of a bank’s sophistication are significantly positively associated with the level
of retained interest. In contrast, bank reputation and credit risk exposure from
on-balance-sheet loans are significantly negatively associated with the level of retained
interest. These findings are robust to the analysis of different subsamples of banks
and to the use of different regression techniques.
However, the findings also suggest that a large fraction of banks at least did
not hold retained interest during the entire life of their mortgage-backed securities.
Splitting sample banks into different groups according to their business models
shows that banks with an originate-to-distribute business model held relatively small
retained interest while having securitized assets with relatively high credit risk. This
observation is consistent with the view that for this particular group of banks investors
neglected the risk of the securitized mortgages.
Analyzing incentives for earnings management, I do not find evidence that banks
smooth reported net income through overstating the value of retained interest from
securitization transactions. This result is consistent with average small securitization
income that generally does not offer much discretion to smooth net income.
My study extends prior research which has until now focused on the impact
of securitization transactions on securitizers’ equity or credit risk. Prior research
has generally shown that securitized assets are risk relevant for the securitizing
firm (Niu and Richardson, 2006; Landsman et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2008; Barth
et al., 2012). There is evidence that the source of this risk relevance is retained
interest in the securitized assets. Yet, there is little empirical research on the motives
and the extent of risk retention in securitization transactions. My paper aims to
contribute to these questions. The findings provide evidence that retained interest in
securitization transactions serves as a mechanism to mitigate information asymmetry
problems as well as a means to manage a bank’s risk profile. These results are relevant
for researchers who are studying the capital market consequences of securitization
transactions. The results are also relevant for policy makers when making decisions
about regulation of risk retention in securitization transactions.
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Figure 1: Typical structure of a securitization transaction
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Table 1: Distribution of retained interest and bank- and loan-specific variables
mean min p25 p50 p75 p95 max count
Retained Interest 0.044 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.023 0.244 0.991 1,355
Interest-only Strips 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.047 0.574 1,355
Subord. ABS & Other Interest 0.032 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.178 0.991 1,350
thereof: Subord. ABS 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.137 0.730 886
thereof: Standby Letters of Credit 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.056 0.342 884
Liquidity Commitments 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.065 1,335
. . . . . . . 0
Delinquent Securitized Mortgages 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.041 0.120 0.298 1,355
High Reputation 0.128 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1,355
Trading Assets 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.091 0.260 1,355
Non Performing Loans 0.010 0.000 0.004 0.008 0.014 0.028 0.054 1,355
Total Assets 15.333 10.607 13.100 15.431 17.259 19.728 21.014 1,355
Deposits 0.688 0.077 0.611 0.710 0.796 0.878 0.906 1,355
Outstanding Securitized Mortgages 0.138 0.000 0.005 0.031 0.127 0.559 2.593 1,355
This table presents descriptive statistics for total retained interest, the components of retained interest and the variables used in the regression analysis of
Retained Interest for the period 2001-2006. Retained Interest is the total of all types of recourse or other credit enhancements provided in mortgage
securitizations. Interest-only Strips are credit-enhancing interest-only strips. Subord. ABS & Other Interest is the total of subordinated securities,
standby letters of credit and other enhancements. Subord. ABS are subordinated securities and other residual interests. Standby Letters of Credit
are standby letters of credit and other enhancements. Liquidity Commitments is the unused portion of a bank’s commitments to provide liquidity to
securitization structures. Total retained interest and the components of retained interest are scaled by the bank’s outstanding principal balance of
mortgages securitized for which servicing or recourse or other credit enhancements have been retained.
Delinquent Securitized Mortgages is the total of outstanding securitzed mortgages past due 30-89 days and outstanding securitized mortgages 90 or more
days past due scaled by the bank’s outstanding principal balance of mortgages securitized. High Reputation is one if a bank or one of its subsidiaries has
been among the top 25 issuers of non-agency mortgage-backed securities in the research period and zero otherwise. Trading Assets is the amount of
trading assets scaled by total assets. Non Performing Loans is the total of loans and leases 90 or more days past due and loans and leases on nonaccrual
status scaled by the total of all loans and leases. Total Assets is the natural logarithm of total assets in thousand US-$. Deposits is the total of domestic
and foreign deposits scaled by total assets. Outstanding Securitized Mortgages is the bank’s outstanding principal balance of mortgages securitized scaled
by total assets.
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Table 2: Distribution of bank- and loan-specific variables by bank type
OTD Banks Universal Banks Div. Comm. Banks Trad. Comm. Banks
N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median
Total Assets in bn USD 51 81.90 19.81 293 154.64 28.84 243 104.38 2.18 723 11.93 0.79
Mortgages 51 0.41 0.40 293 0.31 0.32 243 0.39 0.40 723 0.51 0.51
Consumer Loans 51 0.03 0.01 293 0.07 0.08 243 0.06 0.04 723 0.05 0.04
Comm. & Other Loans 51 0.06 0.03 293 0.16 0.15 243 0.13 0.13 723 0.14 0.14
Loans Held for sale 48 0.17 0.17 293 0.01 0.00 240 0.03 0.01 723 0.02 0.00
Securities 51 0.23 0.14 293 0.28 0.27 243 0.25 0.25 723 0.19 0.19
Trading Assets 51 0.07 0.07 293 0.03 0.00 243 0.02 0.00 723 0.00 0.00
0 . . 0 . . 0 . . 0 . .
Deposits 51 0.36 0.27 293 0.58 0.59 243 0.67 0.68 723 0.75 0.76
Repos & FedFunds Purchased 45 0.23 0.24 284 0.11 0.09 239 0.06 0.03 722 0.04 0.03
Other Borrowings 41 0.16 0.17 293 0.12 0.12 243 0.11 0.11 723 0.09 0.08
Other Liabilities 51 0.28 0.23 280 0.17 0.18 243 0.16 0.17 723 0.11 0.09
0 . . 0 . . 0 . . 0 . .
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 51 0.13 0.12 291 0.12 0.11 243 0.11 0.11 711 0.11 0.11
Non Performing Loans 51 0.02 0.03 293 0.01 0.01 243 0.01 0.01 723 0.01 0.01
Net Interest Income / BVE 50 0.08 0.06 293 0.09 0.09 242 0.09 0.09 718 0.11 0.10
0 . . 0 . . 0 . . 0 . .
Loan Loss Provision 50 0.08 0.07 292 0.10 0.09 239 0.08 0.07 719 0.06 0.05
Total Noninterest Income 50 1.53 1.69 291 0.71 0.54 231 0.76 0.43 723 0.37 0.31
Trading Income 41 -0.12 -0.03 292 0.03 0.00 240 0.05 0.00 723 0.00 0.00
Inv. Banking & Brokerage Income 50 0.03 0.01 287 0.19 0.02 233 0.17 0.01 723 0.02 0.01
Servicing Income 44 -0.00 0.03 292 0.02 0.01 241 0.04 0.04 718 0.01 0.00
Securitization Income 43 0.07 0.02 293 0.02 0.00 241 0.02 0.00 723 0.00 0.00
Gain/Loss from Sale of Loans 42 0.39 0.21 293 0.02 0.01 242 0.07 0.02 723 0.05 0.01
0 . . 0 . . 0 . . 0 . .
High Reputation 51 0.53 1.00 293 0.21 0.00 243 0.25 0.00 723 0.03 0.00
Securitization Ratio 51 3.31 3.07 293 0.11 0.05 243 0.78 0.76 723 0.07 0.03
Mortgages Serviced for Others 48 2.19 1.58 293 0.09 0.04 242 0.61 0.33 721 0.25 0.04
Outstanding Securitized Mortgages 51 1.37 1.09 293 0.03 0.01 243 0.30 0.31 723 0.04 0.02
Delinquent Securitized Mortgages 51 0.06 0.05 293 0.04 0.01 243 0.02 0.01 723 0.02 0.00
Retained Interest 51 0.03 0.00 293 0.09 0.02 243 0.02 0.00 723 0.04 0.00
This table presents descriptive statistics for bank- and loan-specific variables by type of bank for the period 2001-2006. OTD Banks are banks with an orginate-to-distribute
(OTD) business model. Div. Comm. Banks are diversified commercial banks. Trad. Comm. Banks are traditional commercial banks. Mortgages are loans secured by real estate.
Consumer Loans are credit card loans and other consumer loans. Comm. & Other Loans are commercial and industrial and all other loans and leases. Loans Held for Sale are
loans and leases held for sale. Securities is the total of held-to-maturity securities and available-for-sale securities. Trading Assets are trading assets.
Deposits is the total of domestic and foreign deposits. Repos & FedFunds Purchased are securities sold under repurchase agreements and federal funds purchased. Other Borrowings
is other borrowed money and includes, but is not limited to commercial papers, promissory notes, and borrowings from Federal Reserve Banks. Other Liabilities are other liabilites
and include, but are not limited to accounts payable and recourse liabilities.
Tier 1 Capital Ratio is the tier 1 risk-based capital ratio. Non Performing Loans is the total of loans and leases 90 or more days past due and loans and leases on nonaccrual
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status scaled by the total of all loans and leases. Net Interest Income / BVE is the difference between total interest income and total interest expense scaled by the book value of
shareholders’ equity.
Loan Loss Provision are provision for loan and lease losses. Total Noninterest Income is the total noninterest income. Trading Income is net trading income. Inv. Banking &
Brokerage Income is net income from investment banking, advisory, brokerage, and underwriting services. Servicing Income is net income from the servicing of loans held by
others. Securitization Income is net income from securitization transactions. Gain/Loss from Sale of Loans are net gains (losses) on sales of loans and leases.
High Reputation is one if a bank or one of its subsidiaries has been among the top 25 issuers of non-agency mortgage-backed securities in the research period and zero otherwise.
Securitization Ratio is the bank’s outstanding principal balance of mortgages securitized scaled by on-balance-sheet mortgages. Mortgages Serviced for Others are residential
mortgages serviced for others with and without recourse provided scaled by total assets. Outstanding Securitized Mortgages is the bank’s outstanding principal balance of
mortgages securitized scaled by total assets. Delinquent Securitized Mortgages is the total of outstanding securitzed mortgages past due 30-89 days and outstanding securitized
mortgages 90 or more days past due scaled by the bank’s outstanding principal balance of mortgages securitized. Retained Interest is the total of all types of recourse or other
credit enhancements provided in mortgage securitizations scaled by the bank’s outstanding principal balance of mortgages securitized.
On-balance-sheet assets and liabilities are scaled by total assets, except for Non Performing Loans and Retained Interest. Income and expense items are scaled by net interest
income, except for Net Interest Income / BVE.
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix
Retained
Interest
Delinquent
Secu-
ritized
Mortgages
High Rep-
utation
Trading
Assets
Non Per-
forming
Loans
Total As-
sets
Deposits Outstanding
Secu-
ritized
Mortgages
Retained Interest 1.000
Delinquent Securitized Mortgages 0.362∗∗∗ 1.000
0.000
High Reputation 0.059∗∗ 0.333∗∗∗ 1.000
0.031 0.000
Trading Assets 0.123∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.636∗∗∗ 1.000
0.000 0.000 0.000
Non Performing Loans 0.004 0.255∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ 1.000
0.889 0.000 0.006 0.000
Total Assets 0.251∗∗∗ 0.484∗∗∗ 0.587∗∗∗ 0.543∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 1.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
Deposits -0.179∗∗∗ -0.336∗∗∗ -0.357∗∗∗ -0.525∗∗∗ -0.270∗∗∗ -0.631∗∗∗ 1.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Outstanding Securitized Mortgages -0.072∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ -0.344∗∗∗ 1.000
0.008 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 1,355
This table presents Pearson correlations coefficients, p-values and signficance levels for the variables used in the regression analysis of Retained Interest. *
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Retained Interest is the total of all types of recourse or other credit enhancements provided in mortgage securitizations
scaled by the bank’s outstanding principal balance of mortgages securitized. Delinquent Securitized Mortgages is the total of outstanding securitzed
mortgages past due 30-89 days and outstanding securitized mortgages 90 or more days past due scaled by the bank’s outstanding principal balance of
mortgages securitized. High Reputation is one if a bank or one of its subsidiaries has been among the top 25 issuers of non-agency mortgage-backed
securities in the research period and zero otherwise. Trading Assets is the amount of trading assets scaled by total assets. Non Performing Loans is the
total of loans and leases 90 or more days past due and loans and leases on nonaccrual status scaled by the total of all loans and leases. Total Assets is the
natural logarithm of total assets in thousand US-$. Deposits is the total of domestic and foreign deposits scaled by total assets. Outstanding Securitized
Mortgages is the bank’s outstanding principal balance of mortgages securitized scaled by total assets.
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Table 4: Regression of retained interest on bank- and loan-specific variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FE RE RE RE RE FE
Delinquent Securitized Mortgages 0.632∗ 0.717∗∗∗ 0.734∗∗∗ 0.788∗∗∗ 0.789∗∗∗ 0.678∗∗
(0.335) (0.244) (0.244) (0.258) (0.265) (0.338)
High Reputation −0.038 −0.058∗∗ −0.060∗∗ −0.067∗∗
(0.036) (0.030) (0.029) (0.031)
Trading Assets 0.347 0.387 0.413 0.844∗∗∗
(0.249) (0.252) (0.259) (0.305)
Non Performing Loans −1.381∗∗ −1.312∗∗ −1.545∗∗
(0.622) (0.651) (0.721)
Total Assets 0.062 0.005∗ 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.080
(0.061) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.060)
Deposits −0.075 −0.033 −0.015 −0.027 −0.025 −0.031
(0.122) (0.051) (0.059) (0.056) (0.065) (0.127)
Outstanding Securitized Mortgages −0.014 −0.024∗ −0.024 −0.022∗ 0.010 −0.015
(0.019) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.023) (0.020)
OTD Bank −0.055
(0.053)
Universal Bank 0.015
(0.019)
Div. Comm. Bank −0.009
(0.012)
Constant −0.864 −0.040 −0.046 −0.017 −0.021 −1.160
(0.942) (0.066) (0.069) (0.065) (0.070) (0.934)
R-Square Within 0.050 0.042 0.046 0.054 0.060 0.067
R-Square Overall 0.088 0.166 0.170 0.180 0.187 0.082
F 2.896 3.146
Chi-Square 121.838 128.361 100.696 103.347
Prob. > F/ Chi-Square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 1, 355 1, 355 1, 355 1, 355 1, 310 1, 355
This table presents estimates from fixed-effects (FE) and random-effects (RE) regressions of retained interest on bank- and loan-specific variables for the
period 2001-2006. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are * 0.1, ** 0.05,
*** 0.01. Quarter-fixed effects are included. Retained Interest is the total of all types of recourse or other credit enhancements provided in mortgage
securitizations scaled by the bank’s outstanding principal balance of mortgages securitized. Delinquent Securitized Mortgages is the total of outstanding
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securitzed mortgages past due 30-89 days and outstanding securitized mortgages 90 or more days past due scaled by the bank’s outstanding principal
balance of mortgages securitized. High Reputation is one if a bank or one of its subsidiaries has been among the top 25 issuers of non-agency
mortgage-backed securities in the research period and zero otherwise. Trading Assets is the amount of trading assets scaled by total assets. Non
Performing Loans is the total of loans and leases 90 or more days past due and loans and leases on nonaccrual status scaled by the total of all loans
and leases. Total Assets is the natural logarithm of total assets in thousand US-$. Deposits is the total of domestic and foreign deposits scaled by
total assets. Outstanding Securitized Mortgages is the bank’s outstanding principal balance of mortgages securitized scaled by total assets. OTD Bank,
Universal Bank and Div. Comm. Bank are dummy variables for the different types of banks as defined in Subsection 5.1. OTD Banks are banks with an
orginate-to-distribute (OTD) business model. Div. Comm. Banks are diversified commercial banks.
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Table 5: Distribution of earnings management indicators
mean count
D.Loss before SecInc 0.040 1,355
D.Loss Avoided 0.012 1,355
D.Quarterly Decrease before SecInc 0.387 1,355
D.Quarterly Decrease Avoided 0.019 1,355
D.Annual Decrease before SecInc 0.258 1,355
D.Annual Decrease Avoided 0.013 1,355
This table presents descriptive statistics for indicators of earnings management incentives during the
period 2001-2006. D.Loss before SecInc is one if net income before securitization income is negative
and zero otherwise. D.Loss Avoided is one if net income before securitization income is negative and
net income after securitization income is positive and zero otherwise. D.Quarterly Decrease before
SecInc is one if net income before securitization income has decreased from the prior to the current
quarter and zero otherwise. D.Quarterly Decrease Avoided is one if net income before securitization
income has decreased from the prior to the current quarter and net income after securitization
income has increased or remained equal from the prior to the current quarter and zero otherwise.
D.Annual Decrease before SecInc is one if net income before securitization income has decreased
from the prior year’s quarter to the current year’s quarter and zero otherwise. D.Annual Decrease
Avoided is one if net income before securitization income has decreased from the prior year’s quarter
to the current year’s quarter and net income after securitization income has increased or remained
equal from the prior year’s quarter to the current year’s quarter and zero otherwise.
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Table 6: Regression of retained interest on bank- and loan-specific variables and earnings management indicators
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Delinquent Securitized Mortgages 0.787∗∗∗ 0.787∗∗∗ 0.786∗∗∗ 0.788∗∗∗ 0.788∗∗∗ 0.788∗∗∗
(0.259) (0.259) (0.258) (0.257) (0.258) (0.259)
High Reputation −0.060∗∗ −0.060∗∗ −0.059∗∗ −0.060∗∗ −0.059∗∗ −0.059∗∗
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Trading Assets 0.387 0.396 0.387 0.376 0.386 0.388
(0.252) (0.256) (0.251) (0.244) (0.251) (0.252)
Non Performing Loans −1.359∗∗ −1.388∗∗ −1.370∗∗ −1.387∗∗ −1.363∗∗ −1.378∗∗
(0.616) (0.623) (0.614) (0.630) (0.604) (0.620)
Total Assets 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Deposits −0.029 −0.031 −0.027 −0.025 −0.027 −0.027
(0.056) (0.057) (0.057) (0.058) (0.056) (0.056)
Outstanding Securitized Mortgages −0.022∗ −0.022∗ −0.022∗ −0.023∗ −0.022∗ −0.022∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
D.Loss before SecInc −0.008
(0.014)
D.Loss Avoided −0.017
(0.021)
D.Quarterly Decrease before SecInc −0.003
(0.004)
D.Quarterly Decrease Avoided 0.016
(0.029)
D.Annual Decrease before SecInc −0.002
(0.006)
D.Annual Decrease Avoided −0.006
(0.009)
Constant −0.015 −0.013 −0.016 −0.019 −0.016 −0.017
(0.064) (0.064) (0.065) (0.066) (0.065) (0.065)
R-Square 0.180 0.181 0.180 0.182 0.180 0.180
Chi-Square 108.880 110.738 102.308 109.689 112.210 102.593
Observations 1, 355 1, 355 1, 355 1, 355 1, 355 1, 355
This table presents estimates from a random-effects regression of retained interest on bank- and loan-specific variables and indicators of earnings management incentives for the
period 2001-2006. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are * 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01. Quarter-fixed
effects are included. Retained Interest is the total of all types of recourse or other credit enhancements provided in mortgage securitizations scaled by the bank’s outstanding
principal balance of mortgages securitized. Delinquent Securitized Mortgages is the total of outstanding securitzed mortgages past due 30-89 days and outstanding securitized
mortgages 90 or more days past due scaled by the bank’s outstanding principal balance of mortgages securitized. High Reputation is one if a bank or one of its subsidiaries has
been among the top 25 issuers of non-agency mortgage-backed securities in the research period and zero otherwise.Trading Assets is the amount of trading assets scaled by total
assets. Non Performing Loans is the total of loans and leases 90 or more days past due and loans and leases on nonaccrual status scaled by the total of all loans and leases. Total
Assets is the natural logarithm of total assets in thousand US-$. Deposits is the total of domestic and foreign deposits scaled by total assets. Outstanding Securitized Mortgages
is the bank’s outstanding principal balance of mortgages securitized scaled by total assets. Earnings management indicators are as defined in Table 5.
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Table 7: Sensitivity analysis
RI Banks only: RE RI Banks only: FE Tobit 2 Cluster Mkt Share Dummy
Delinquent Securitized Mortgages 1.035∗∗ 0.907∗ 1.572∗∗∗ 0.903∗∗∗ 0.857∗∗∗
(0.433) (0.530) (0.505) (0.296) (0.270)
High Reputation −0.068∗ −0.213∗∗∗ −0.065
(0.036) (0.076) (0.040)
Mkt Share −0.133∗∗∗
(0.042)
Trading Assets 0.699∗∗ 1.138∗∗ 1.024 0.431 0.550∗
(0.325) (0.453) (0.662) (0.376) (0.309)
Non Performing Loans −3.845∗∗ −3.577∗∗ −4.324∗ −1.370 −1.275∗∗
(1.718) (1.777) (2.598) (0.887) (0.600)
Total Assets −0.008 0.062 0.036∗∗∗ 0.005 0.005
(0.010) (0.092) (0.010) (0.004) (0.003)
Deposits −0.012 0.009 −0.191 −0.034 −0.029
(0.117) (0.263) (0.129) (0.052) (0.055)
Outstanding Securitized Mortgages −0.067 −0.079 −0.018 −0.029 −0.022∗
(0.042) (0.063) (0.041) (0.024) (0.012)
Constant 0.241 −0.943 −0.497∗∗ −0.014 −0.030
(0.196) (1.647) (0.206) (0.075) (0.074)
R-Square 0.125 0.130 0.700 0.177 0.249
F/ Chi-Square 465.323 51.106 1.762 34.722 115.085
Prob. > F/ Chi-Square 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000
Observations 550 550 1, 355 1, 355 1, 355
This table presents estimates from different regression techniques for regressions of Retained Interest on bank- and loan-specific variables for the period
2001-2006. "RI Banks only: FE" is a fixed-effects regression including only banks with Retained Interest. "RI Banks only: RE" is a random-effects
regression including only banks with Retained Interest. "2 Cluster" is a OLS regression with standard errors clustered by firm and quarter. "Tobit" is a
tobit regression for data censored at zero as the lower limit. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are
clustered at the firm level in all regressions except for "2 Cluster". Significance levels are * 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01. Quarter-fixed effects are included.
Retained Interest is the total of all types of recourse or other credit enhancements provided in mortgage securitizations scaled by the bank’s outstanding
principal balance of mortgages securitized. Delinquent Securitized Mortgages is the total of outstanding securitzed mortgages past due 30-89 days and
outstanding securitized mortgages 90 or more days past due scaled by the bank’s outstanding principal balance of mortgages securitized. High Reputation
is one if a bank or one of its subsidiaries has been among the top 25 issuers of non-agency mortgage-backed securities in the research period and zero
otherwise. Mkt Share is one if the bank’s share of the total issuance volume of non-agency mortgage-backed securities is at least 2 percent in the research
period and zero otherwise. Trading Assets is the amount of trading assets scaled by total assets. Non Performing Loans is the total of loans and leases 90
or more days past due and loans and leases on nonaccrual status scaled by the total of all loans and leases. Total Assets is the natural logarithm of total
assets in thousand US-$. Deposits is the total of domestic and foreign deposits scaled by total assets. Outstanding Securitized Mortgages is the bank’s
outstanding principal balance of mortgages securitized scaled by total assets.
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